UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
JUL 29 1952
PERIODICAL READING ROOM

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

VOL. XLIX, NO. 15: JULY 17, 1952

CONTENTS

Philosophy and Argumentum ad Hominem: HENRY W. JOHNSTONE, JR. 489

Ethics and Explanation: JOHN LADD 499

Communication

A Personal Tribute to Ernst Hoffmann (1880–1952): ANNA FORBES LIDDELL 505

Book Reviews

ANGUS SINCLAIR, *The Conditions of Knowing; an Essay towards a Theory of Knowledge:* ROBERT D. MACK 506

JOHN DASHIELL STOOPS, *The Integrated Life:* HAROLD A. LARRABEE 512

MATTOS ROMÃO, *Galileu e o método científico, Vol. I:* EDWARD ROSEN 513

New Books 515

Notes and News 516

PUBLISHED FORTNIGHTLY

BY THE

JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, INC.

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

FOUNDED BY FREDERICK J. E. WOODBRIDGE AND WENDELL T. BUSH

EDITORS: Herbert W. Schneider, John H. Randall, Jr., Ernest Nagel.

MANAGING EDITOR: Emerson Buchanan.

Communications to the editors should be addressed to the Managing Editor, 515 West 116th Street, New York 27, N. Y. Subscriptions and advertisements should be sent to THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, Prince and Lemon Streets, Lancaster, Pa., or 515 West 116th Street, New York 27, N. Y. The annual subcription price (twenty-six numbers) is $5.25. The price of single numbers is 35 cents, double numbers, 60 cents.

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY is owned by the Journal of Philosophy, Inc., and published fortnightly at Prince and Lemon Sts., Lancaster, Pa. Editorial Office: 515 West 116th St., New York 27, N. Y. President, Ernest Nagel; Vice President, Herbert W. Schneider; Treasurer, Frederick A. Dewey; Secretary, Iris Wilder Dean.

Entered as second class matter, March 18, 1921, at the Post Office at Lancaster, Pa., under Act of Congress of March 3, 1879.

Acceptance for mailing at special rate of postage provided for in paragraph (d-2), section 34.40, P. L. & R. of 1948, authorized March 11, 1952.

Publishers: G. E. STECHERT & Co., New York - ATLAS PUBL. & DISTR. Co., Ltd., London - HERMANN & Cie., Paris - NICOLA ZANICHELLI, Bologna - H. BOUVIER & C., BONN a/Rh - EDITORIAL HERDER, Barcelona - F. MACHADO & Cia, Porto - FRIEDRICH KILIAN'S NACHFOLGER, Budapest - F. ROUGE & Cie., Lausanne - THE MARUZEN COMPANY, Tokyo.

1952 46th Year **REVIEW OF SCIENTIFIC SYNTHESIS**

Scientific Committee

G. AMRELLINI – G. CALÒ – F. GIORDANI – G. GOLA – M. GORTANI
A. C. JEMOLO – G. LEVI DELLA VIDA – E. PERSICO
P. RONDONI

"SCIENTIA" Chief - Editor: Paolo Bonetti

IS THE ONLY REVIEW that has a really world-wide circulation.

IS THE ONLY REVIEW of synthesis and unification of science, that deals in its articles with the newest and most fundamental problems of all branches of knowledge: scientific philosophy, history of science, mathematics, astronomy, geology, physics, chemistry, biological sciences, physiology, psychology, history of religions, anthropology, linguistics. "Scientia" thus studies all the main problems interesting the intellectual circles of the whole world.

IS THE ONLY REVIEW that among its contributors can boast of the most illustrious men of science in the whole world. "Scientia" publishes the articles in the language of their authors. Every number has a Supplement containing the complete French translation of the articles, which in the text are published in the Italian, German or Spanish language.

SUBSCRIPTION: $11.00 U.S.A.

For information apply to "SCIENTIA" *Asso* (Como, Italy)

VOLUME XLIX, No. 15 JULY 17, 1952

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

PHILOSOPHY AND *ARGUMENTUM AD HOMINEM*

ONE of the commonest arguments against the naturalistic view of knowledge is that it fails to make its own assertion and defense intelligible. For, as a recent version of this argument points out, "In thus deriving mind and knowledge from nature, as science conceives it," the naturalist

> must assume that his own account of nature is true. But on his premises, the truth of this account, like that of any other bit of knowledge, is merely the function of the adjustment of the organism to its environment, and thus has no more significance than any other adjustment. Its sole value is its survival value. This entire conception of knowledge refutes itself and is, therefore, *widersinnig*.[1]

This criticism characteristically evokes one of two replies. The first is a chuckle. This is the reaction of the naturalist who regards such argumentation as innocent dialectical sport, like the conversations in *Through the Looking-Glass*. The second is a cautionary wag of the finger, intended to remind us of the stratification of types in logical theory.[2] If the statement, "All knowledge, including this, is merely the function of the adjustment of the organism to its environment," is paradoxical, this is surely because the critic has failed to see that "this knowledge" belongs to a higher type than "all knowledge." This obvious proviso is supposed to render the naturalistic theory invulnerable to the criticism in question.

To the chuckle we need not reply. It is the response of the unreflective man when confronted with any reflective analysis, and in fact represents his adjustment to an intellectual environment rather than a responsible argument. The logical admonishment, however, deserves an answer. Let us begin by noting that in general, there are only two reasons for distinguishing among types. One is to avoid logical contradictions, and the other is to represent real differences in scope or abstractness among propositions.

Now the first of these valid motives for citing the theory of types cannot, in the present instance, exist. For the paradox in question

[1] Wilbur Marshall Urban, *Beyond Realism and Idealism* (London, Allen and Unwin, 1949), p. 236.

[2] No one specific version of type-theory is, of course, intended either here or in the sequel. Indeed, the criticism to be developed here would apply, *mutatis mutandis*, to a defense based upon the assumption of a hierarchy of languages as well as of types.

—the sense in which the naturalistic position is *widersinnig*—is not logical. The proposition that knowledge of the truth of naturalism has a naturalistic explanation is not formally inconsistent. Indeed, there are occasions when a useful purpose is served by the utterance of such a proposition. To the biographer, for example, it may be of importance to show that a certain naturalistic philosopher adopted his views as a mode of adjustment to his environment.

But this very example suggests the force of the argument we are examining. To explain in naturalistic terms the beliefs of the naturalist, or of the philosopher of any other persuasion, is to discredit those beliefs. It is essential to the philosopher to claim responsibility for his own statements, to come to his own conclusions, to criticize without external constraint, to be governed by ideas rather than by inarticulate forces. Even when he is most aware of the effect of environment upon thought, his expression of this effect must involve a self-control not wholly to be accounted for in terms of environment. No attack upon a philosopher is more devastating than the statement, "Your beliefs are merely the function of your adjustment to your environment," whether his environment be physical, physiological, social, economic, literary, or academic.

Thus the defender of a thoroughgoing naturalistic view of knowledge is, in effect, saying, "I am not responsible for my own statements." This is a paradox. But since it differs only by a personal pronoun from the non-paradoxical statement, "You are not responsible for your own statements," whose importance has just been indicated, this cannot be the type of paradox arising from a confusion of types. What it does arise from is the predicament of the speaker. He cannot express his lack of responsibility while at the same time maintaining the responsibility of his expression. But only he is in this predicament; those who attack him are not.

The type of paradox which besets the thoroughgoing naturalist has been called "pragmatic." In general, a pragmatic paradox is a proposition whose credibility is undercut by the act of uttering it. For the utterance has implications which the proposition itself does not. To utter, "I never use correct English," I must use correct English. But the fact that I must is not implied by the proposition itself. Similarly, the proposition that I am not responsible for my own statements does not in itself imply that I am; only its utterance does. This feature of pragmatic paradoxes serves once again to distinguish them from antinomies engendered by the confusion of types; for the proposition, "The class of all classes which are not members of themselves is not a member of

itself," does imply its own contradictory, whether it is uttered or not.[3]

The defender of the naturalistic view of knowledge may agree that the paradox exposed by the argument against naturalism which we are considering is not logical. But he may still insist on the observation of a hierarchy of types. The knowledge that all knowledge is the function of the adjustment of the organism to its environment is not itself such a function, but belongs to a higher type, he may say. The distinction can be indicated by subscripts; I have knowledge$_2$ that all knowledge$_1$ represents adjustment. Phrased in this language, the paradox in question seems to disappear; for I need only assert that I am responsible$_2$ for the statement that I am not responsible$_1$ for my own statements.

But can the distinction between knowledge$_1$ and knowledge$_2$ ultimately be maintained? Where knowledge$_1$ is not philosophical, it can; for the two types of knowledge will possess characteristics through which they can be identified and ordered from a point of view neutral to both. Thus I know$_2$ that my knowledge$_1$ of the land-areas of the continents arises from the latest almanac. In such a case, my knowledge$_2$ is the theory of my knowledge$_1$, and is distinguishable from it by virtue of being more general and of answering to a different procedure of verification.

In the case in question, however, knowledge of the lower type must include philosophical as well as non-philosophical judgments. For surely philosophy is not exempted from the generalization that all knowledge represents the adjustment of the organism to its environment; indeed, the intent of this generalization has usually been specifically to contravene the claim of philosophy to be independent of environment. But here it is difficult to see how the distinction between the two types is meaningful. By what mark can the naturalist distinguish his philosophical knowledge$_1$ from his

[3] I have been helped in coming to conclusions about pragmatic paradoxes by discussions in *Mind* by D. J. O'Connor (Vol. 57, July, 1948, pp. 358–359, and Vol. 60, October, 1951, pp. 536–538), and L. J. Cohen (Vol. 59, January, 1950, pp. 58–87); also by correspondence with Professor C. I. Lewis. Paul Weiss discusses such paradoxical situations in *Man's Freedom* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1950), p. 212. In "Cosmic Necessities," *The Review of Metaphysics*, Vol. IV, March, 1951, Weiss says, "An existential absurdity is not intrinsically impossible. It expresses a conceivable state of affairs. It is not self-contradictory. It can appear; it can be entertained, believed, asserted. It is absurd because its existence or meaning denies what is required in order that it be or have a meaning. It is absurd because it denies the possibility of its own occurrence." (P. 359.)

In *The Intelligible World* (London, Allen and Unwin, 1929), Urban gives further reasons why a paradox of this sort is not strictly logical. See especially pp. 45–46.

philosophical knowledge$_2$, other than by his mere wish to withhold from knowledge$_2$ the criticism which he applies to knowledge$_1$? For in principle, there is no difference either in generality or in verifiability between the naturalistic theory of knowledge and the other philosophical theories it "explains."

While non-philosophical knowledge must be distinguished from the theory of that knowledge, there is no corresponding distinction between philosophical knowledge and its theory; for there is no theory of philosophy which is not itself philosophy. So far, only the view that philosophy is a function of adjustment has been considered. Other theories might be cited, on which philosophy is identified as a function of psychology, sociology, logic, language, or world-spirit. But in each case the identification is itself a philosophical point of view, in principle having no characteristics through which it would unerringly be perceived by a neutral observer to belong to a higher type than the philosophies it claims to subsume. Who, for example, can ascertain whether "All philosophy is a function of language" is higher in type than "All philosophy is a function of psychology" without himself being committed to one of these views?[4]

Since philosophical statements cannot essentially be distinguished as to scope or abstractness, the second reason for distinguishing among types does not apply to them.[5] We must conclude that the theory of types has no relevance to arguments such as the attack upon naturalism at present in question.

Our criticism of the naturalistic theory of knowledge was that this did not permit its own responsible utterance. Let us call a philosophy which does permit its own responsible utterance "self-referential." The principle of the polemic we are examining may then be called "refutation by self-reference," or more simply, "self-referential refutation." Many philosophical positions have been attacked by this self-referential criticism. Among them we may instance Scepticism,[6] Behaviorism,[7] Pragmatism,[8] Intuitionism,[9]

[4] Compare Paul Weiss, "The Theory of Types," *Mind*, Vol. 37, July, 1928, pp. 338–348, *passim*.

[5] A clear statement of the view under attack is to be found in Whitehead and Russell, *Principia Mathematica* (Cambridge, University Press, 2nd ed., 1925), Vol. I, p. 38.

[6] See Urban, *The Intelligible World*, pp. 45–46.

[7] See Lovejoy, "The Paradox of the Thinking Behaviorist," *Philosophical Review*, Vol. 31, March, 1922, pp. 142–147.

[8] See Royce, "The Eternal and the Practical," *Ibid.*, Vol. 13, March, 1904, especially pp. 128–129.

[9] See Hocking, *Types of Philosophy* (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1939), p. 201.

The Coherence Theory,[10] views which attack Idealism,[11] and views which oppose Utilitarianism.[12] But this represents only a random selection.

A preliminary word may be said in favor of the self-referential type of argument. This is that it is often used by a person to criticize himself.[13] "Do I meet my own standards?" one may ask. And no one thinks that this self-criticism is in any sense "unfair." But if it is not "unfair" for one person, it is difficult to see how the mere introduction of a second party could *make* it unfair.

But the validity of self-referential refutation, and its appeal or force, still require examination. For even those who are willing to admit that this argument violates no canon of type-theory may condemn it as a *non-sequitur*. To conclude the falsity of a position merely from the predicament of its advocate is, it will be said, only an *argumentum ad hominem*.

It will not be our purpose to deny that the polemic of self-reference is an *argumentum ad hominem*. Instead, we shall attempt to distinguish a valid employment of this device from its customary invalid uses. We shall try to show not only that self-referential refutation exemplifies this valid use, but also that many other types of philosophical argumentation belong to the same category, and indeed that no genuine *argumentum ad rem* is available for philosophical controversy.[14]

For a good preliminary definition of a fallacy identified by traditional logic, one can do no better than to refer to an older handbook, such as that of Whately. "In the '*argumentum ad hominem*,'" Whately states, "the conclusion which actually is established, is not the absolute and general one in question, but relative and particular; *viz.*, not that 'such and such is the fact,' but that '*this man* is bound to admit it, in conformity to his principles of reasoning, or consistency with his own conduct, situation,' &c."[15]

[10] See Spaulding, *The New Rationalism* (New York, Henry Holt and Company, 1918), pp. 350–351.

[11] See Royce, *Lectures on Modern Idealism* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1919), pp. 237–240.

[12] See Bentham, *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1876), Ch. I, Sect. 13–14.

[13] Compare Max Black, *Critical Thinking* (New York, Prentice-Hall, 1946), p. 216.

[14] I find my opinion corroborated in general in the two books by Urban which I have already cited, and by F. B. Fitch in "Self-Reference in Philosophy," *Mind*, Vol. 55, January, 1946, pp. 64–73.

[15] Richard Whately, *Elements of Logic* (New York, William Jackson, 1838), p. 196.

Now self-referential polemic does seek to establish what a man is bound to admit, in conformity to his principles of reasoning or situation. The naturalistic account of knowledge implies that the philosopher, like all men, is in a situation in which his knowledge is a function of his adjustment to his environment. And the self-referential refutation of that account simply calls attention to that situation. It supposes that the naturalist is now bound to admit that his naturalism is itself a result of adjustment.

Let us compare this use of *argumentum ad hominem* with an obviously fallacious application of it. To an opponent who defends suicide, says Schopenhauer in *The Art of Controversy*,[16] "you may at once exclaim, 'Why don't you hang yourself?' Should he maintain that Berlin is an unpleasant place to live, you may say, 'Why don't you leave by the first train?' Some such claptrap is always possible."

Why is this "claptrap"? Only because the principle of reasoning or situation to which the refuter calls attention is one in which his opponent has no essential stake. The distaste for Berlin may be only an idiosyncrasy. Or if it is a consistent motive, it may not be an ultimate one. Most men identify themselves with a purpose which takes precedence over geographical considerations; perhaps such a purpose irresistibly detains this man in a Berlin which he nevertheless finds unpleasant. Similarly, he who argues for suicide is not likely to feel an undeniable urge for self-destruction; he will represent it as contingent upon conditions, like sacrifice or *Weltschmerz*, which he may not regard as at all relevant to himself.

Suppose, however, that one's respondent does in fact feel an unconditional obligation to leave Berlin or to do away with himself. The force of the argumentation ironically suggested by Schopenhauer can only be to confirm such a feeling. And the man who asserts that he is essentially bound to leave Berlin, and yet fails to leave it, is in a position of fundamental confusion. No logical canon is violated by a critic insofar as he merely points out this confusion.

Borrowing the terminology of Kant, but not necessarily his conclusions, we may say that *argumentum ad hominem* is invalid when the principle to which it calls attention is intended only as a hypothetical imperative. The resident of Berlin who says "Leave Berlin!" cannot properly be accused of confusion if what he really means is "Leave Berlin if you want to preserve your health." For he may be prepared to take the consequences of continued residence. The only valid method of attacking such a principle is *argumentum*

[16] Tr. by Bailey Saunders (London, Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1896), p. 28.

ad rem: one might, for example, adduce evidence that living in Berlin is not necessarily injurious to health.

But where a principle proposed as a *categorical* imperative is violated or disregarded by its proponent, it can only be circumspect to point this out. If a deliberate liar should say, "Never tell lies," then at the very minimum this would mean that the command has come from a confused mind—one unable to identify an act as falling under a rule it has itself proposed. In addition, suspicion may properly fall upon the command itself. For there would appear to be a viewpoint from which it both ought to apply to all cases and need not apply to them. But to point out such confusion it is only necessary to show what "*this man* is bound to admit, . . . in conformity to his principles of reasoning or consistency with his own conduct [or] situation." *Argumentum ad hominem* is therefore valid in exposing confusion with respect to a categorical imperative. Nor is any *argumentum ad rem* available for attacking an imperative of this sort. For if an obligation is truly unconditional, it is conditional upon no fact. "Even if it should happen that, owing . . . to the niggardly provision of a step-motherly nature, [a good] will should wholly lack power to accomplish its purpose," Kant asserted, ". . . like a jewel, it would still shine by its own light. . . ."

Now if there is any respect in which the philosopher has a fundamental stake in his viewpoint, or in which he intends that viewpoint as a categorical imperative, *argumentum ad hominem* will in that respect be a valid polemical device. And the following considerations should make clear what fundamental stake the philosopher does have in his own philosophy.

Any genuinely philosophical view is perfectly general. To restrict it to statements about any specifiable class of individuals or entities is to reduce it to the special theory of that class. Thus the study of man is philosophy, and so is the study of time. But the study of man in America is sociology or anthropology, and the study of the Seventeenth Century is history.

To the extent, therefore, that the philosopher characterizes human nature and the categories of human thought, he must be characterizing his own nature and thought. On pain of exclusion from the philosophical enterprise altogether, he must suppose that his assertions reveal what is essential to him as well as to other men. In proposing that his view be adopted he is is effect stating a categorical imperative ("Interpret the world in this particular way!"). Not only is this a rule from which he cannot make himself an exception, as he would if he thought he could interpret *himself* in some privileged way, but also he may accept this rule

for no ulterior reason. For such a reason, if authoritative, would suggest that some men are fundamentally motivated in ways not envisaged by the philosophy in question. The philosopher who asserts that all men are basically motivated by a need for adjustment takes an incoherent position if he supposes that *he* can be basically motivated by a need for truth.

Yet philosophers have frequently attempted to exempt themselves from their own outlooks. A case in point would be the naturalist to whom we have referred as an example. His viewpoint represents a fundamental confusion. And the propriety of arguing *ad hominem* in order to call attention to such confusion has already been indicated. We can only conclude that this is a context in which the use of *argumentum ad hominem* to attack philosophy is valid.

Having established that *argumentum ad hominem* is formally valid in certain restricted contexts, let us consider its appeal or persuasive force within these contexts. For while the naturalist may confess that his position is confused, he may deny that he is under any obligation to mitigate the confusion. Perhaps he will aver that it is just because such confusion seems characteristic of metaphysics that he prefers to speak only the language of science.

In this case we can remind him that the confusion is still there, and that his argumentation, like any, is cogent only in a universe of discourse free from confusion; the price of confusion is failure to maintain the conditions of controversy. This is in itself an *argumentum ad hominem*; it elicits the secondary confusion of supposing that a primary confusion can be intelligibly admitted. More fundamentally, we can point out that when the confused mind is pitted against the clear one, the presumption is with the latter and the burden of proof is on the former. Indeed, only the latter can prove anything.

Not only ought confusion to be shunned in itself, but also the confused mind can make no appeal to the clear one. On the other hand, the clear mind can exploit the inconsistencies of the confused one. The force of this exploitation is to invite the latter to abandon ambiguity and incoherence.

But it is likely to be objected that the occasions of this valid use of *argumentum ad hominem* are far too restricted for this type of argument to serve as a general device of philosophical polemic. One may perhaps in this manner impugn the qualifications of an occasional slipshod philosopher. But philosophical controversy does not concern the qualifications of particular philosophers; it has to do rather with the merits of philosophical points of view, considered without regard for their authors.

The reply here hinges on the intelligibility of the proposition that a philosophy might be true even though all of its proponents had been refuted. For if one proponent can be refuted by *argumentum ad hominem*, all can. While this does have a purely personal force, the ingredient of personality to which it appeals in the attack we are now considering is precisely that identified with the philosophical point of view in question. And even though each proponent staunchly maintains that he is not affected by the polemic addressed to his principles, yet there is an obvious sense, just now clarified, in which he *ought* to admit defeat. The obligation is simply that of the confused mind confronted by the clear one.

To all intents and purposes, then, *argumentum ad hominem* operates as an objective argument against a philosophy, as well as a means of discrediting its witnesses. So the polemic of self-reference is not invalidated by the use of this argument. And since it is not, any philosophy not permitting its own responsible utterance can be refuted. From this there follows a general desideratum of philosophy, as well as a first principle of polemic. The desideratum is to be self-referential. The principle is to attempt to attack alien philosophies by showing that on their own principles they are unintelligible.

The question suggests itself whether there can be any genuine *argumentum ad rem* against a philosophical point of view. Three considerations, perhaps not independent of one another, but brought out at different points of this essay, have the force of a negative reply. In the first place, to the extent that a philosophy functions as a categorical imperative, it is conditional upon no fact. In the second place, philosophical views cannot be arranged according to any unquestionable order of types. Propositions asserting facts or hypotheses, on the other hand, can be so arranged; indeed, they must be, if logical paradoxes are to be avoided. A philosophy does not, therefore, assert a fact or hypothesis, and so cannot be supported by any appeal *ad rem*. Finally, the significance of asserting that a philosophy ought to be *self*-referential is to imply that its validity depends on no reference to a fact or situation *external* to it.

In the absence of any valid *argumentum ad rem* we must suppose that all philosophical polemic, not just that of self-reference, is, in essence, addressed *ad hominem*. And, in fact, the one feature common and peculiar to effective argumentation in philosophy is that it takes seriously the point of view it sets out to overthrow. In the scope of this essay, however, it would be hopeless to attempt to document this thesis. Perhaps we can do no better than to

refer in conclusion to some of the more common principles, other than the one we have examined, which govern effective philosophical argumentation. A close relative of self-referential refutation is the *tu quoque argument*, which consists in pointing out that one's opponent has committed an error of which he accuses others. And another argument belonging to the same family is the charge that in applying a certain term to the whole of a region, the philosopher under attack has undercut the very distinction between the term and its contraries which makes its application significant. (If all men are basically selfish, how can we distinguish selfish from unselfish behavior in the first place?) Self-reference and these two related polemical principles are of fundamental importance in attacking monisms.

One may attack a dualism, on the other hand, by showing that its proponent cannot, in his own terms, maintain the distinction regarded as fundamental. And in general, one may refute principles by pointing out that they are arbitrary, or occult. That this is not an *argumentum ad rem* is indicated by the consideration that while it is no criticism of astronomy to assert that nine is an arbitrary number of planets or of electronics to point out that electrons are occult, to bring these charges against the seven deadly sins and material substance, respectively, seems relevant. Above all, a philosophical position may be refuted by showing that it is inconsistent. This, like all the other principles just mentioned, is purely and simply an *argumentum ad hominem*. "In the game of disputation," says Joseph, "we may be held to score a victory if we force an opponent to an admission inconsistent with the thesis he propounded. But in the search for truth, to convict any one of inconsistency is irrelevant; we have to determine what is true."[17] Instead, we are content to let our criticism dwell only upon the *statement* of a point of view. Even the realist, who of all philosophers will feel most shocked and affronted by this repudiation of *argumentum ad rem*, possesses much paraphernalia for detecting fallacies,[18] but no instruments for observing facts. It is in this respect that philosophy in general parts ways with descriptive discourse.

HENRY W. JOHNSTONE, JR.

WILLIAMS COLLEGE

[17] H. W. B. Joseph, *An Introduction to Logic* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1916), p. 591, footnote 2.

[18] See, for example, Holt *et al.*, *The New Realism* (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1912), pp. 11–21.

ETHICS AND EXPLANATION

THE distinction between the discourse of justification and explanation is essential to an understanding of the nature of ethics and ethical theory. The purpose of justification is to produce conviction in the hearer (or in the agent himself) by certain types of discourse conducted according to certain rules. The request for a justification usually takes the following form: "Why should I . . . (believe *x*, do *x*, like *x*, etc.)?" An appropriate answer consists in providing a "good reason" for one of these.

The aim of explanation, on the other hand, is an ordering of phenomena under general laws. It is usually predictive, and should provide us with statements that have "potential predictive force." I shall use the word *explanation* in a very broad sense to include simple ("inductive") generalization, categorization, prediction, subsumption under general regularities or general, including statistical, laws. It is what used to be called "induction," but is better described in terms of hypothesis and verification. To the question "Why?," explanation answers by a subsumption under a general statement.[1] Thus instead of providing "reasons," explanation offers what might be called a "cause" or a "causal law" —if these terms are interpreted liberally.

Ordinary discourse is often at the same time justificatory and explanatory. For example: "It is going to rain." "Why should I believe that?" "Because there are black thunder clouds in the sky, and such clouds are usually followed by rain." In this little dialogue I am both seeking to convince you and to predict the coming of rain by the use of a statement of general regularities.[2]

Sometimes the methods of justification and explanation are entirely different. Suppose in the above dialogue I had answered to the question "Why?" the following: "Because Mr. Smith, the weather man, said so." This statement is probably more likely to produce conviction in you than my amateurish generalizations.

[1] For a more precise account of explanation, cf. Hempel and Oppenheim, "Studies in the Logic of Explanation," *Philosophy of Science*, Vol. 15 (April, 1948), pp. 135–175. I am using the word "explanation" somewhat more broadly than it is used in this article, since the explananda will include particular phenomena, and the explanantia will include general statements of various types including simple generalizations (which are usually of "first level") and statistical laws. The purpose of this present paper does not require a more precise treatment of the logic of explanation. (The phrase "potential predictive force" is taken from the article cited.)

[2] Cf. Tomas, "Ethical Disagreements and the Emotive Theory of Values," *Mind*, Vol. LX (April, 1951), pp. 205–222. Tomas points out how scientific discourse as well as ethical discourse aims at justifying and rectifying, i.e., altering an attitude (i.e., epistemic attitude).

Nevertheless, my statements about Mr. Smith's opinions are not explanatory in the sense that the statement about clouds and rain is.

Justification belongs to the more general type of discourse called *persuasion*. They both aim at producing, altering, or reinforcing conviction of one sort or another, but justification proceeds *according to certain explicit or implicit rules* which determine the correctness or incorrectness of the procedure, and it is thereby distinguished from propaganda and various types of suggestion.[3]

The important point is that explanation is a different process from justification. The confusion between the two results in an illicit introduction of what Stevenson calls *persuasive definitions*.[4]

I have purposely used the vague word "conviction" in describing the aim of justification. This word refers not only to the "fixation of belief" but also to the "fixation" of other types of conscious human activities, namely, voluntary actions, decisions, policies, feelings, interests, and dispositions which are often lumped together under the word "attitude." Ethical discourse is not concerned primarily with justifying beliefs, but rather voluntary actions. This process of justification in turn employs various prescriptive norms which mediate and justify those actions. I shall use the word *norm* to stand for whatever justifies actions directly or indirectly by justifying other norms. Thus it will serve as a general designation for all the following types of *justificantia:* moral judgments, moral rules, ideals, ends, and the principles of correct ethical reasoning.[5] We may say therefore that ethical justification uses and also provides norms for conduct.

Now there are explanatory sciences which seek to explain the acceptance of norms without attempting to justify them, or even without commitment to the norms themselves. A large part of the

[3] Although the distinction between justification and persuasion is only briefly mentioned by Stevenson and Ayer, their theory can account for the difference by introducing different levels of ethical discourse. The norms of ethical discourse, i.e., the distinction between "good" and "bad" reasons, are ultimately "not disputable" and in that sense persuasive. Cf. Stevenson's answer to Brandt, *Philosophical Review*, Vol. LIX (October, 1950), pp. 528–534; Toulmin, *Reason in Ethics*; Feigl, "De Principiis Non Disputandum," *Philosophical Analysis* (ed. by Black).

[4] Cf. E. M. Adams, "Nature of Ethical Inquiry," *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XLVIII (Sept. 13, 1951): "The statement that the maximum satisfaction of all relevant desires ought to be achieved is true by definition of the moral word 'ought'" (p. 572).

[5] The nature of ethical reasoning is discussed in more detail in my forthcoming article entitled "Reason and Practice" in *Essays in Realism* (ed. by John Wild). For a further discussion of "voluntary action," cf. my "Free Will and Voluntary Action," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Vol. XII (March, 1952), pp. 392–405.

social sciences is devoted to this type of investigation. For the social theorist, these norms are a subject to be investigated and not principles to be obeyed.[6]

Traditional philosophies of ethics have oscillated between justification and explanation. In order to distinguish these processes I shall refer to the former as *ethics proper*, and to the latter as *ethical theory*.[7] Recently it has been said that what I call ethics is the business of the moralist, and ethical theory that of the philosopher.[8] However, it must be remembered that the moralist seeks to justify, not merely to persuade; i.e., certain methods are outlawed. Ethical theory seeks to explain, and therefore uses the methods of explanation which are similar to those of the other empirical sciences such as psychology, physics, meteorology, linguistics, etc.

The question immediately arises: What is the difference between ethical theory and the social sciences? They are both explanatory and both are concerned to explain norms. It might be denied that there is any distinction, or perhaps it is merely one of specialization, i.e., that ethical theory is like psychology in being merely a part of the social sciences. That is what I take to be the view of Stevenson and Ayer, who have coined the term "meta-ethics" to designate the science of explaining norms and the discourse of ethical justification in general.[9]

However, it seems to me that a valid distinction can and must be made between ethical theory and social theory. Ethical theory is that branch of social theory which seeks to *explain those norms which are binding upon the person undertaking the inquiry*. Thus an ethical theorist cannot be neutral towards his subject-matter as a social theorist would be, but his method of treating this subject-matter aims at explanation rather than justification. I suggest that this is essentially what philosophers as different as Hume, Kant, Bradley, and Moore are trying to do. All of these accept

[6] I do not deny that individual social scientists may ultimately be motivated by moral principles (i.e., norms), but their immediate aim is explanation rather than justification of norms. Natural scientists, of course, may be similarly motivated. Cf. Kaufmann, *Methodology of the Social Sciences*, "the theoretical goals of scientific inquiry . . . are exclusively defined in terms of deductive logic and empirical procedure" (p. 67).

[7] I prefer to use the term "ethical theory" instead of the more fashionable "ethical analysis," because the latter suggests that the theory is limited to linguistic analysis to the exclusion of psychological or possibly metaphysical considerations.

[8] Cf. Stevenson, *Ethics and Language, passim*.

[9] "I have tried not to judge but only to understand what goes on in ethics —my metanormative inquiry being itself nonnormative" (Stevenson, *Philosophical Review*, *loc. cit.*, p. 528; "understand" = "explain"?). I must confess that I do not find the conception of "meta-ethics" to be very clear.

certain norms as binding, i.e., those of a Christian society—the so-called "Moral Facts"—and then attempt to explain these norms in terms of other principles, whether they be those of empirical psychology, rational psychology, epistemology, or a certain theory about the nature of reality.[10] Although many contemporary theorists have restricted themselves to linguistic analysis, they are essentially in the same tradition of explanatory ethics.

Let me illustrate this by reference to G. E. Moore's *Principia Ethica*. Moore accepts certain norms as binding, i.e., certain kinds of things as good, and certain experiences as embodying these norms. He advances an explanatory hypothesis to explain this binding quality and the experiences in terms of cognition of certain objective non-natural qualities of the things in question. Following my interpretation, his theory should be judged according to its theoretical adequacy in explaining these normative phenomena.[11] But it is worthy of notice that Moore does not seek to justify the norms in question. He takes them for granted. His only concern is to explain them. Also, it should be noted that he does not wish to explain norms *in general*, but only those binding upon him. Thus he is not interested in explaining the norms of primitive peoples but only those of his own society. His work is therefore explanatory and ethical at the same time, i.e., an ethical theory.

I shall call those ethical theories which accept unquestioningly (dogmatically) certain norms as binding: *naive ethical theories*. Certainly many ethical theories of the last two hundred years are now recognized to be naive in their disregard of the complexities and conflicts of norms of members of different cultures, and, indeed, within our own culture. This does not mean, however, that such theories have no value as explanatory hypotheses, since they may often be applied to different norms than the ones originally constituting the data to be explained.

[10] Note that none of the men mentioned is a "moral reformer." "We do not need science and philosophy to know what we should do to be honest and good, yea, even wise and virtuous" (Kant, *Grundlegung*, Abbott, p. 20).

[11] Moore's hypothesis is accordingly plainly false, it seems to me, because it rests on a refutable analogy between goodness and sense-qualities. Cf. Toulmin, *op. cit.*, ch. 2. There are other possible difficulties with a non-naturalistic explanation if one accepts Hempel's requirement that "the explanans must have empirical content," (*loc. cit.*, p. 137). One reason for the intuitionist's propensity to describe the acceptance of ethical norms as cognitions is because cognitions, like perceptions and intuitions, are used as justifications for belief. My colleague Roderick M. Chisholm has pointed out to me that a term such as "perception" already possesses the normative element which makes it a "good reason" for belief. Thus Moore is mixing up the discourse of explanation with that of justification. I should add that a "good reason" for belief is not sufficient, of itself, to be a "good reason" for action; i.e., a motive for believing is not a motive for acting.

The interrelationship between ethics proper and ethical theory is extremely complicated if one is to take a more sophisticated approach. The complications arise from two sources: (1) The generalizations of ethical theory, originally explanatory hypotheses, often become norms in their own right. Thus explanatory principles are easily transformed into principles of justification. (2) There are many levels of explanation, corresponding to levels of generality, and those of low generality *appear* to be essentially different from those of higher generality.

I shall discuss the latter of these first. The interconnection between various hypotheses in the sciences is complex. For the sake of simplicity I shall distinguish between (a) simple generalization and (b) theoretical explanation. Thus in my example about the weather, "dark clouds are followed by rain" is a simple generalization, in this case based upon direct observation. The subsumption of this generalization under more general physical and meteorological laws involving temperature, pressure, humidity, etc. would be a theoretical explanation. No sharp line can be drawn between these two types of statement; the difference is merely one of degree of generality.

Ethical theory also contains these two types of general statements. Let us look at the following example from a purely theoretical point of view. An ethical theorist might begin by generalizing about certain norms of right and wrong conduct. Lists of *prima facie* duties or obligations would result. Possibly then he might notice that some one characteristic is common and peculiar to these norms. He could then formulate a general statement about his norms. If he continued, and if he were empirically minded, he would then attempt to subsume this general statement under psychological and sociological laws.

The first step is the original logical character of many ethical generalizations. For instance, the two laws of love formulated by Christ could be interpreted as generalizations about the norms set forth in the Ten Commandments: "On these two commandments hang all the Law and the Prophets." Or, for another example, consider Bentham's principle of utility. Bentham advances this principle as a general principle under which all our previously accepted norms can be subsumed.[12] I suggest that Kant's three formulations of the categorical imperative may be interpreted in like manner as a simple generalization about the duties that he considered to be binding. In all these cases, the generalization can usually be checked by direct self-observation, and so acquires

[12] "By the natural constitution of the human frame, on most occasions of their lives men in general embrace this principle, without thinking of it," etc. (Bentham, *Principles of Morals and Legislation*, ch. 1, xii).

the appearance of being self-evident. Incidentally, my distinction between simple generalization and theoretical explanation is paralleled by Kant's distinction between the analytical procedure (Sections I and II of the *Grundlegung*) which analyzes the notion of duty, and the synthetical procedure (Section III) which shows the relation of the general notion of duty to the Will, etc.

The other complication arises from the fact that explanatory generalizations naturally tend to become norms in their own right. Thus Christ and Bentham not only intended to generalize about norms already accepted, but also to advance these general principles as criteria of what was in the future to be regarded as binding. Kant had no such purpose in mind, but in effect his Categorical Imperative is often accepted as a norm of conduct and not as a mere generalization ("analysis") about duties.[18]

The issue is even more complicated when we consider a philosopher like Dewey. Dewey not only generalizes about our norms, but proceeds to relate them to impulses and habits in terms of modern psychological theory. Then these theories are offered as providing norms to be accepted and followed.

The process by which explanatory principles, either simple generalizations or theories, become principles of justification might be called *persuasive explanation*, if I may be allowed to change slightly Stevenson's felicitous phrase. Perhaps we should call them, more adequately, "justifying explanations."

The points which I have made will explain what is meant by the distinction between "implicit" and "explicit" ethical principles. Implicit principles are those which are discovered by explanatory ("inductive") methods, but upon discovery become justifications, i.e., explicit ethical principles. The human mind naturally makes this transition, and it is only by virtue of this that moral progress and reform are possible.

This paper has been but a brief resumé of the nature of ethics and ethical theory. Perhaps I should say that they can be distinguished but not separated. At any rate, I think it should be evident that the whole subject cannot be approached naively, with sledge-hammer techniques, but must be treated as a subtle issue.

JOHN LADD

BROWN UNIVERSITY

[18] "Theory, as such, is no more prescriptive in ethics than anywhere else, but only predictive. . . . In ethics the predictions are of certain spontaneous ethical judgments. . . . (But) where a theory of given ethical judgments is concerned, it is genuinely possible for the person whose ethical judgments they are to make the facts predicted by the theory—which consist of other ethical judgments by that person—conform to the theory."—Ducasse, "The Nature and Function of Theory in Ethics," *Ethics*, Vol. LI (October, 1940), p. 35.

COMMUNICATION

A PERSONAL TRIBUTE TO ERNST HOFFMANN (1880–1952)

The death of a scholar is a loss to the world. The requisite synthesis of inexhaustible enthusiasm, rigorous discipline, continuing patience, insight, and judgment which constitutes scholarship is too rare.

On the twenty-eighth of January, 1952, Professor Ernst Hoffmann died in his home in Heidelberg, Germany. From 1922 he had been Professor Ordinarius of Philosophy and Pedagogy in Heidelberg University. He was also an active member of the Heidelberg Academy. Firm in his assertion of individual and academic freedom, Professor Hoffmann earned the disfavor of the Hitler regime, and in 1935 was forced into retirement. Although he was never sent to a concentration camp he was harassed and humiliated, even actually endangered during the war years. After the American occupation of Heidelberg Professor Hoffmann was reinstated in the University, but his health was broken. His scholarly interest never lessened, but the amount of his activity was necessarily curtailed. Unable to leave his house, he had to give up lecturing at the University. Allowed to sit up for only a few hours each day, he devoted the most of that time to research, to writing, and to conducting, one evening a week, there in his own home his seminar in the philosophy of Nicholas of Cusa.

In this country Professor Hoffmann is best known for his major part in collating and editing the original manuscripts of Nicholas of Cusa. The project of publishing a scholarly (Latin) edition of the collected works of Nicholas was undertaken by the Heidelberg Academy in 1927. Professor Hoffmann's interest in Nicholas grew out of the endeavor to trace the relation between Greek and Christian thought, an endeavor shared with his professional colleague and personal friend, Professor Ernst Cassirer. According to Professor Hoffmann's own statement, Professor Cassirer was the first to recognize the significance of Nicholas of Cusa in the development of western thought, but he himself made the more intensive study of that important yet still not fully appreciated philosopher of the Fifteenth Century.

Professor Hoffmann was always more concerned with the advancement of learning than with the achievement of personal reputation, but his influence was great and widespread and will continue. Humanist in the best sense, he combined wide learning and philosophic insight with deep human sympathy and understanding. As the power of his intellect and the strength of his character

won the respect and admiration of all who knew him, so too his simple kindliness and gentle humor won their love.

ANNA FORBES LIDDELL

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY

BOOK REVIEWS

The Conditions of Knowing; an Essay towards a Theory of Knowledge. ANGUS SINCLAIR. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co.; London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd. 1951. 260 pp. 3.50.

In the beginning of his book Mr. Sinclair tells us that the conditions under which we know, our attitudes of mind about the nature of knowledge, determine the limits within which fall all our opinions and the acts based on them. Also he tells us that we cannot assume a reality independent of knowledge (to do so is to commit the epistemologist's fallacy); rather, what we know depends on our theories, i.e., on our ways of selecting and grouping in our attention. Obviously none of these ideas is new. The overriding importance of theory is a familiar theme of idealism. The notion that to say X is Y really means if O (an observer) looks at X, then there will be the appearance of Y is familiar in empirical and pragmatic tradition. And the emphasis on attitudes of mind and on grouping and selecting in attention is commonplace among subjectivists of all schools and among psychologists in particular.

The newness and originality in Mr. Sinclair's book lie largely in the lavishness of his rejections of prevalent views about the nature of knowledge. All these prevalent views, it is claimed, are wrong or at least misleading. We must change our way of looking at all facts. The freshness and boldness of this statement hardly can be denied. During the past fifty years we have seen idealists attacked by pragmatists, pragmatists by neo-realists, neo-realists by logical positivists, phenomenologists, and logical empiricists. Mr. Sinclair strikes out against them all, shrewdly borrowing weapons from those he belabors as the occasion demands.

There will be those who think that Mr. Sinclair's affirmations are as radical as his rejections. I shall list below some of these basic affirmations and the rejections which they involve:

1 a (affirmation). We cannot assume a reality independent of knowledge, of our ways of grouping and selecting in our attention. There are no objects which simply are what they are; all depends on the theories of the man who experiences them.

1 r (rejection). Therefore we cannot meaningfully say that that from which we group and select in our attention is in itself

systematic or not systematic, progressive or non-progressive, purposive or non-purposive. Whether or not there is system, progress, or purpose depends on what is selected and grouped in attention.

2 a. We never know what anything *is* (in itself).

2 r. Therefore science does not tell us what reality really is, nor do causality statements and probability statements assert the real nature of material things—they are ways of grouping and selecting in our attention.

3 a. No subject or situation can be treated without reference to an observer.

3 r. Therefore time, space, order, and cause cannot be treated as absolutes or as independently real. Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometries are simply different ways of grouping in attention.

4 a. There are no "facts" independent of theories; theories are basic, facts derivative. There are no simple sensations or sense-data independent of theories. What we know is always a wide situation within which is a sub-situation on which attention is concentrated.

4 r. Knowing is not a relation in which a knower stands to what is known but is a relation in which something that is known stands to something else that is known. Following from the rejection of the distinction between knower and known Sinclair rejects: (1) the distinction between objective and subjective experience, (2) the theory that there are states of the self and objects which it knows, (3) the theory that thinking is an operating with symbols, (4) the distinction between *a priori* and *a posteriori,* (5) the theory that there is a fundamental distinction between knowledge and belief, (6) the contrast between nominalism and realism, and (7) the opposition between materialism and idealism.

5 a. Language is not basically symbolic; it is causative. It causes someone to adopt certain attitudes and follow certain ways of grouping in attention.

5 r. Therefore words and statements (propositions) are not fundamentally different. It is untenable to cling to the traditional distinctions between objects, propositions, and the verbal or other expression of the propositions. Consequently Sinclair rejects: (1) the notion that knowledge consists in knowing propositions and in knowing whether they are true or false, (2) the belief that by examining the structure of propositions we are obtaining further information about the nature of knowledge itself, and (3) the subject-predicate structure of propositions and the view that the understanding of a philosophic problem is advanced by discovering if the statements about it are analytic or synthetic.

6 a and r. The traditional distinction between body and mind is

rejected and it is asserted that there is an entity or situation such that it can be described in one way as a body and in another way as a mind. Similarly the distinction between knowing and acting is rejected and these are treated as different descriptions of an entity or situation.

7 a and r. Since there are no particular entities, only sub-situations within larger situations, there is neither a definite nor an absolute difference between appearance and reality. These terms represent a difference within what is directly experienced. What we know or experience must be reality and we must know or experience it directly. Disagreement arises because men experience different parts of reality or parts differently grouped. Errors and appearances are the results of knowing only parts of reality. A man may be in error because he selects and groups in his attention in ways which are unsatisfactory by a criterion. The criterion of truth and falsity, as for holding one attitude or theory rather than another, is five-fold: (1) relative simplicity, (2) permitting forecasting, (3) relative stability, (4) manageable consequences, (5) relative comprehensiveness. Sinclair feels that these five ought to be formulated as one, but that so far he has not been able to do this. Ultimately there are three sets of conditions of knowing: (A) epistemological conditions: i.e., our attitudes, theories, ways of selecting and grouping in attention; (B) physiological conditions: i.e., the states of sensory organs and the central nervous system; (C) the nature of reality: i.e., reality offers us a range from which we can select, but just this range. Reality is that from which we select and group in attention.

8 a and r. We distinguish in our experience feelings, sensations, emotions, and things. These are not four essentially different orders of experience, but differences of degree of one order. Feelings and emotions are not *states of* the self to be contrasted with things as *objects for* the self; there is no absolute difference between these but a difference in degree of localization. The most primitive experience is indeterminate feeling (a general feeling tone) and this, by sustained effort, becomes more localized; e.g., sensations are more precisely localized than feelings, and the most precisely localized experience is called a "thing." We call unlocalized experience a state of the self.

9 a and r. Most traditional theories of the nature of meaning presuppose a distinction between: (a) words or symbols themselves, (b) the particular objects denoted, (c) the connotation of the words or symbols. This distinction rests on two false epistemological theories: (1) that there are words or terms which may have meaning but cannot be true or false, and that there are propositions which

alone can be true or false; and (2) that there are particulars and universals. The first theory has to be abandoned because the traditional distinction between what is true or false and what has meaning has to be abandoned. The replacing distinction is between words employed to cause men fairly definitely to hold certain attitudes and to consider tentatively holding those attitudes. The second theory has to be abandoned because of arguments given earlier, e.g., that there are no absolute distinctions between things: there are no things as such in themselves.

10 a and r. The traditional correspondence and coherence theories of truth depend on the false assumption that truth and falsity are properties of propositions. Truth is a reference to linguistic contrivances which cause men to adopt attitudes and theories which account for the relevant data. (If they do not, they are false.)

11 a and r. Traditional theories of inference deal with relations between propositions and thus depend on the theory that propositions are self-complete units. Because this is false, the whole theory of inference is false. What is usually called a premise is a series of linguistic contrivances which lead one to attend to a wide situation and some sub-situation within it. One is then led to *observe* that the sub-situation is such that attention could have been drawn to it by a different series of contrivances, namely, those we call the conclusion. This is what is meant by making an inference. The relation between "premise" and "conclusion" is that both are descriptions of the situation and sub-situation, and the connection between them lies in the situation itself. Stating or predicating is the use of words or other devices to cause men to adopt certain attitudes or to make more clear attitudes already held. Actually there is no such subject as logic. Its place is to be taken by grammar, philology, semantics, etc.

Inductive logic is equally misleading, being based on the false presupposition that the world consists of particular things and that particular events take place in it. The whole problem of induction is fabricated—there are no universals and particulars, and, therefore, there is no problem of how to get a universal from particulars. The problem is really "what is the nature of any explanatory theory?" And there is no such *entity* as an explanation; what is really involved is: (a) a man not in blank ignorance, (b) a problematic situation, (c) the man's adopting some change in the conditions under which he experiences so that the problem is resolved. The linguistic contrivances he uses to make others aware of his new theories or ways of grouping in attention are the statement of the explanation. It differs from other statements in that it causes a more adequate attitude to be held. Proof, too, is a series of con-

trivances so precise and effective that by them we do get others to adopt intended attitudes.

Thus meaning, statement, inference, explanation, proof, and knowing or experiencing are not (as traditionally thought) different in kind, but instances of something more general. This is a drastic simplification. We can now consider not these six separately but men, each man holding his own hierarchy of values and altering other men's values; each trying to find attitudes or theories which will account for all the relevant data or which will eventuate in our experiencing situations which are satisfactory by some agreed criterion. And we now see that "statement," "inference," "proof," "explanation," "knowing," and "experiencing," are names for some of the more conveniently distinguishable kinds of epistemological situations wherein the chief concern is man's adoption or rejection of attitudes.

The above offers a summary of some of the leading ideas in *The Conditions of Knowing*. I should not be surprised to find the book enjoying a wide popularity since the writings of iconoclasts appeal to the rebel in all of us. The question which comes to my mind is whether or not the book shatters itself by attempting to root philosophy in the attitudes of mind of observers. Mr. Sinclair's view of the conditions of knowing turns and returns us again and again to the attitudes individuals have and their processes of selecting and grouping in their attention. This approach has the effect of making the real world amorphous, structureless, and its objects dependent on individual consciousnesses and all the caprices of individual minds. Thus we are told that "to speak of an order, or indeed of anything, which is independent of my knowledge of it" is to fall into the epistemologist's fallacy. But to speak of an order independent of my knowledge does not mean I can know what I do not know; it means that there are objects that are real in the sense that they are constituent elements of the world which are independent of the caprices of mind and not dependent on anyone's attitude. Mr. Sinclair's metaphorical account of reality will no doubt alienate those who are attempting to find a more objective ground for epistemology.

A problem that Mr. Sinclair recognizes but does not seem to resolve adequately is the conflict between his assertion that epistemology has a superior status in philosophy over metaphysics and his assertion that reality is itself a condition of knowing and is directly known.

Much of what Mr. Sinclair rejects (e.g., the distinction between subjective and objective, states and objects of the self) depends on his rejection of the knower-known relationship. Other readers

beside myself may be annoyed by Mr. Sinclair's promise in the thirteenth chapter (*Knower and Known*) to give arguments for this position in later chapters only to find in later chapters (e.g., chapter seventeen, p. 159) that we are referred back to chapter thirteen for the very reasons we were told to expect in the later chapters.

Mr. Sinclair's account of meaning follows the pattern established in the beginning of the book and turns the question into one of attitudes. The distinction between what has meaning and what is true or false is abandoned in favor of contrivances which change people's attitudes. This emphasis on the purely personal is of a piece with the recommendation (p. 108) that all of us be tested in a psychological laboratory to determine whether or not we are a predominantly visual or tactual type. Although Mr. Sinclair says that the word "attitude" is synonymous (for his purposes) with the word "theory," the fact that his thinking is highly subjective (in the sense of making realities dependent on individual minds) is revealed when he says that "the study of attitudes of mind or ways of selecting and grouping in attention is already pursued under the name of psychology" (p. 195). Here, at least, it seems clear that he does not mean merely that psychology studies theories. His qualifying note (pp. 213–214) on the importance of psychological factors in knowing bears out my point.

Mr. Sinclair's inveterate subjectivism is apparent in his account (Appendix A) of discriminable factors in epistemological situations wherein he avers that to analyze a work of art without explicit reference to the men who make it and to the men who experience it (p. 218) is to fulfill only a superficial purpose.

To sum up: Mr. Sinclair's book will please:

1. Idealists: for its emphasis on theory.
2. Positivists: for its avowal of the superiority of epistemology over metaphysics.
3. Psychologists: for the overriding importance given to attitudes and the men who experience them.
4. Bergsonians: for the view that knowledge is direct.
5. Bradleyans: for the belief that error is a partial view of reality.
6. Whiteheadians: for emphasis on process as opposed to substance.
7. Anti-scientists: for insistence on the inability of science to tell us what reality is.
8. Philosophers of science: for its open-mindedness to almost any theory of probability, time, and space.
9. Determinists: for holding that the question "Is man free?" is meaningless.

10. Relativists: for insisting on the impossibility of saying anything about any event as such or in itself.

Obviously all the above will be displeased by whatever their philosophic rivals are pleased with. Also, all those who search for indubitable basic ultimates, sensory or otherwise, will be displeased; this includes (according to Sinclair) "Cartesians, Logical Positivists, theological revelationists, Platonic Idealists and innumerable others." Logicians will find much to object to in the position that language is causative, not symbolic, and will claim that this analysis is either useless or naive or both.

Mr. Sinclair's theory of truth (a theory is true if it accounts for all relevant data) will probably satisfy no one because the words "account for" are no clearer than the rejected theories of coherence, correspondence, working, etc., or it will satisfy anyone because the criterion for adopting one attitude rather than another includes coherence, correspondence, working (consequences), permitting forecasting, and comprehensiveness.

ROBERT D. MACK
CONNECTICUT COLLEGE

The Integrated Life. JOHN DASHIELL STOOPS. New York: Richard R. Smith Publisher Inc. 1951. 180 pp. $3.00.

The purpose of this book is "the overcoming of our traditional Western dualism" which has "tortured Western man from the days of Plato down to the present." For Platonism "brought about the disassociation of the thought life of the individual—interpreted as his real life—from the flux and unreality of his lower instincts and emotions. Platonism is the spiritual monastery of the non-Catholic world." The result has been an anarchistic and directionless individualism rooted in a false belief in "the absoluteness of the individual consciousness" and a corresponding neglect of social institutions as if they were but secondary expressions of pre-existing individuals. Over and over again Professor Stoops tells us that "the individual as he has been conceived and defined by Western social and religious and political thought has no real existence." This notion of the mind "as an inner entity or subject, disassociated from human impulses and their environment, came into the West from the Orient. We must surrender this idea" (pp. 53, 77). In language strongly influenced by John Dewey, the author pleads for an integration of outer and inner, of cortex and thalamus, of conscience and instinct, through interactions which will continuously remold both the individual and his community. "The West must learn from the East that the individual can exist and survive only as a part of a larger encircling system of life" (pp. 52–53). "It was precisely this lack of integration between the individual and his

social environment that was singled out by fascism as the central weakness in democratic societies" (p. 124).

The problem of our Western culture is "to secure a technique of thought which will enable us to integrate our too subjective, too fragmented individual lives into that sense of wholeness which characterized ancient classical life . . . by building a form of society which consciously and with clear purpose willingly incorporates into its growing, plastic structure the initiative and creativeness of its individual members" (p. 155). This will involve a redefinition of the individual, which has never been carried out "on a basis of freedom." This new individual "must function organically in a political system, and must have a vocational and family life appropriate to this political system." "We are face to face with the problem of achieving a voluntary, democratic integration of the individual with his community as powerful as the integration which was achieved by fascism and is now achieved by communism." What is needed is a voluntary integration which will be "as strong as the nonvoluntary solidarity of the German or the Russian type" (pp. 160, 166, 176–177).

Except for some of the vocabulary, Hegel said most of this, and quite as repetitiously. But the partial integrations which have stemmed from Hegel are threatening as never before to submerge the hard-won individualism upon which Professor Stoops heaps so much obloquy. To his "world community of righteousness," no one will take exception. But the direct path to it through organic theories of the state may well prove to be the long way to nowhere.

HAROLD A. LARRABEE

UNION COLLEGE

Galileu e o método científico. Vol. I. MATTOS ROMÃO. Lisbon: Gaspar Pinto de Sousa. 1944. 391 pp.

Professor Mattos Romão of the University of Lisbon, having been invited by a group of his colleagues to deliver a lecture (February 27, 1943) in commemoration of the tercentenary of Galileo's death, published an expansion of that discourse in his university's *Revista da Faculdade de Letras*, X (1944), 95–275; XI (1945), 90–289. He has had those pages reprinted separately in the form of the book under review. Describing it as the first of two volumes, he promises to put a bibliography at the end of Vol. II, but expresses no such intention regarding an index.

Mattos Romão's subject is Galileo and the scientific method. Viewing Nature as a simple, mathematical mechanism, Galileo investigated its properties by the analytico-synthetic procedure, which alternately frames hypotheses and deduces their consequences, to

be tested by observation and experiment. The bulk of Mattos Romão's book (from p. 36 on) examines how these ideas penetrated Galileo's writings.

Mattos Romão does not interpret his theme narrowly. When discussing the sunspots, for example, he briefly considers the question whether Galileo was the first to discover them (his answer is yes); and at greater length he reports the information about the physical constitution of the sun which later astronomers have added to Galileo's beginnings. Similarly, after summarizing Galileo's faulty explanation of the tides, he expounds Newton's more felicitous theory and its modifications in recent times. Such attention to modern developments bulks large in his treatment of many topics, and he frequently glances back at ancient and medieval thinkers in an effort to achieve the proper historical perspective.

He is usually content to handle ideas without analyzing them closely. A curious instance may be mentioned. Originally he said that Galileo "in a certain way seems to consider uniform circular motion as inertial" (p. 381); hence it would follow that Galileo failed to achieve complete clarity about the principle of inertia,[1] according to which motion in a circle is not inertial but accelerated, requiring the application of a force. It was only after working out this study in detail that Mattos Romão encountered Alexandre Koyré's *Études galiléennes* (Paris, 1939) with its emphatic denial (III, 116) that Galileo formulated the principle of inertia. Mattos Romão then proceeded to voice his disagreement with Koyré by inserting a footnote covering the better part of fourteen pages (pp. 299–312) and concluding that Galileo "understood, applied and formulated" the principle of inertia, a conclusion in conflict with the decision he had reached before reading Koyré. This internal conflict he cures by the simple expedient of advising the reader in an addendum (p. 390) to cancel the offending lines on p. 381, a precaution which he failed to take in 1945 (*Revista*, XI, 344). Modern thought owes so much to Galileo that there is no need, even for his most ardent admirer, to advance any claim on his behalf that is not fully justified.

A bit of unintentional humor is provided by Mattos Romão's remark that the variation of latitude was discovered "by Almucantar and Küstner, respectively in the United States (Cambridge) and Berlin" (p. 371; repeated three times on p. 372, n. 1). It was Seth C. Chandler who determined the latitude of Harvard College Observatory with the astronomical instrument known as an almu-

[1] *Le Opere di Galileo Galilei*, national edition (Florence, 1890–1909; reprinted, 1929–39), VII, 56.

cantar.[2] Mattos Romão writes about the "famous experiment of the Tower of Pisa" (p. 67) as though it actually happened, ignoring the recent demonstrations in the secondary literature that it belongs to the realm of myth, not history. He misdates the publication of Kepler's *Mysterium cosmographicum* (p. 63).

Students of Galileo will wish Mattos Romão success in producing his second volume.

EDWARD ROSEN
THE COLLEGE OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK

NEW BOOKS

BAUER, RAYMOND A.: *The New Man in Soviet Psychology.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1952. xv, 229 pp. [Russian Research Center Studies, 7.] $4.00.

BONNER, JOHN TYLER: *Morphogenesis; an Essay on Development.* Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1952. vi, 296 pp. $5.00.

BRAIN, W. RUSSELL: *Mind, Perception and Science.* Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas, Publisher. [1951.] vi, 90 pp. $2.50.

BUYTENDIJK, F. J. J.: *Phénoménologie de la rencontre.* Texte français de Jean Knapp. [Paris:] Desclée de Brouwer. [1952.] 59 pp. (Textes et études philosophiques.)

CANTOR, GEORG: *Contributions to the Founding of the Theory of Transfinite Numbers.* Translated, and Provided with an Introduction and Notes, by Philip E. B. Jourdain. New York: Dover Publications, Inc. [1952.] vii, 211 pp. Paper $1.25.

D'ABRO, A.: *The Rise of the New Physics; Its Mathematical and Physical Theories (Formerly Titled "Decline of Mechanism").* [New York:] Dover Publications, Inc. [1951.] 2 vols. $8.00.

"This second edition contains corrections by the author and new sections of portraits."

FITCH, FREDERIC BRENTON: *Symbolic Logic; an Introduction.* New York: The Ronald Press Company. [1952.] x, 238 pp. $4.50.

FLEWELLING, RALPH TYLER: *The Person, or, The Significance of Man.* Los Angeles: The Ward Ritchie Press. [1952.] xii, 339 pp. $4.00.

GILBERT, KATHARINE: *Aesthetic Studies: Architecture & Poetry.* [Durham, N. C.:] Duke University Press. 1952. vii, 145 pp. $3.00.

[2] *Astronomische Nachrichten,* CXII (1885), 113; *Astronomical Journal,* XI (1891–92), 59.

NOTES AND NEWS

Patrick Romanell, for some time Professor of Philosophy at Wells College, has received a Department of State grant to serve as Visiting Professor of Philosophy at El Colegio de México during July and August of this year. He has also received an appointment as Associate Professor of Medical Philosophy and Ethics at the School of Medicine of the University of Texas, effective September 1, 1952. During the coming academic year, 1952–1953, he will be Fulbright lecturer at the University of Turin, Italy.

The National Broadcasting Company television station WNBQ is presenting a series of four Sunday talks on logic on its "Live and Learn" program. Speakers and subjects were announced as follows: July 13, "The Nature of Argument," by Professor Warner Wick, of the University of Chicago; July 20, "The Basis of Argument," by Father Thomas Conley, of DePaul University; July 27, "How Not to Argue," by Professor Lionel Ruby, of the Roosevelt College of Chicago; August 3, a panel discussion by the three preceding speakers.

Professor Ruby has recently given ten half-hour talks on logic on FM radio and five fifteen-minute talks on logic over television station WBKB.

The First International Congress on Humanism and Ethical Culture will meet in Amsterdam, Holland, August 21–26, 1952. The organizations associated in calling the Congress are the American Ethical Union, the American Humanist Association, the British Ethical Union, the Ethische Gemeinde (Vienna), and the Humanistisch Verbond (Netherlands).

Julian Huxley will be President of the Congress; H. R. Hoetink, William Heard Kilpatrick, Gilbert Murray, and Jules Romains will be Vice-presidents.

"The Congress is a first step on the way to establishing the means of a continuous collaboration between thinkers and workers who share the general point of view of those who have come together in humanist and ethical groups in order to develop an instructed common purpose oriented towards a universal democratic and rational civilization dedicated to the dignity and worth of man."—Quoted from the Second Announcement of the Congress.

Persons or groups who wish to join the Congress are invited to write to the organizing secretary: Mrs. H. A. Polak-Schwarz, 50 Oranje Nassaulaan, Amsterdam-Z, Holland.

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

There is no similar journal in the field of scientific philosophy. It is issued fortnightly and permits the quick publication of short contributions, prompt reviews, timely discussions, notes on new books and other journals, and news of philosophic interest. The last five issues contain:

VOLUME XLIX

No. 10. May 8, 1952.
Double Number.

Some Neglected Philosophic Problems Regarding History. MAURICE MANDELBAUM.
What is Philosophy of History? LEWIS S. FEUER.
Historical Interpretation and Culture Analysis. HORACE L. FRIESS.
Comments on the Symposium "What is Philosophy of History?" STERLING P. LAMPRECHT, JOSÉ FERRATER-MORA, MAURICE MANDELBAUM.

No. 11. May 22, 1952.

Euthyphro, Mill, and Mr. Lewis. ALBERT L. HAMMOND.
The Passing of Privileged Uniqueness. FREDERIC SOMMERS.

No. 12. June 5, 1952.

The Alleged Privacy of Experience. JUSTUS HARTNACK.
The Logic of Experience. RICHARD D. MOSIER.
Heidegger's "Being." J. GLENN GRAY.

No. 13. June 19, 1952.

Negative Things. RICHARD TAYLOR.
Towards a Natural Teleology. D. MAURICE ALLAN.

No. 14. July 3, 1952.

Tendency: The Ontological Ground of Ethics. JOHN WILD.
Comments and Criticism: More on Professor Pepper's Theory of the Aesthetic Object. JAMES L. JARRETT.

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
515 W. 116th St., New York 27, N. Y.

$3.25 per annum (26 numbers) single numbers, 35 cents; double numbers, 60 cents

A New French Edition with Notes of the

Complete Philosophical Works of

CONDILLAC

Edited by G. LE ROY

3 *quarto* volumes—2000 pages

Paper bound $15.00 — Cloth bound $20.00

(Postage Additional)

Order from American Bookstores or directly from the publishers

PRESSES UNIVERSITAIRES de FRANCE

180, Boulevard Saint-Germain, Paris VIe

These are the first volumes to appear in a monumental

CORPUS GENERAL
DES PHILOSOPHES FRANÇAIS

under the general editorship of Raymond Bayer, Director of the International Institute of Philosophy of the Sorbonne, Paris, and sponsored by UNESCO. Prospectus of the 33 volumes available on application.

The Works of BUFFON in Press

An Exceptional Opportunity for Libraries to Purchase Classics at Bargain Prices. Continuation Orders Welcome.